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Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.*
As more and more consumer transactions are conducted via mail and
telephone, courts begin to face difficult issues of contract formation.
Vendors cannot reasonably be expected to tirelessly read cumbersome
boilerplate language over the phone just as consumers cannot be expected to
suffer through such a monotonous recitation. Consequently, consumers
agree to purchase products without knowing all of the contract terms, with
the understanding that they will be able to "back out" of the contract if they
later encounter provisions, such as arbitration clauses, that they find
unacceptable. Although courts usually allow such an understanding, the
consumer's ability to be released from the contract obligations depends on
when and if a contract was actually formed. Even if a court finds contract
formation, it may strike various provisions which are unfair or unlawful. 2
Rich and Enza Hill initiated a consumer transaction with Gateway in
September of 1995.3 After reading about an offer for a computer system in a
magazine, they called Gateway and ordered the computer for $4,009 plus
tax and shipping. After receiving the computer, the Hills discovered
numerous defects and inadequacies in the system based in part on Gateway's
misrepresentations of the system in the magazine advertisement. 4
Accompanying the system was a "Standard Terms and Conditions
Agreement," which contained, among other items, a three-year limited
warranty,5 a liability limitations clause6 and an arbitration clause. 7 The
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
1 In 1989, the mail order industry reached $183.3 billion in sales, up 75-fold from 1967.
Moreover, more than 54% of Americans made at least one mail order purchase in 1990. See
State e rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 209 (N.D. 1991).
2 E.g., unconscionability, or in some situations, arbitration clauses. See infra note 12.
3 See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 96-C4086, 1996 WL 650631, at *I (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 7, 1996).
4 See id. at *1-2. The CD-ROM that the Hills received was allegedly a slower model
than the one described in the ad, a model which performed poorly due to "sub-par materials"
used by Gateway. Moreover, the "surround sound" speakers promised by. Gateway allegedly
did not produce surround sound but instead emitted a "static or hiss." Gateway admitted that it
did not offer surround sound speakers, and that there had been a misprint in its advertising. In
addition, Gateway allegedly substituted an inferior graphics accelerator without informing its
customers. Overall, the Hills would have had to pay an additional $1000 to get the system
they thought they had ordered. See id.
5 The district court did not reproduce the warranty clause, stating only that it contained
"various exclusions and limitations." Id.
6 The liability limitations clause stated:
Any liability of Gateway under this Agreement is expressly limited to the price by Buyer
for the Products that are the subject of a dispute or controversy. Buyer's sole remedy
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Hills had not seen this agreement before receiving the computer and had no
prior notice that an arbitration clause would be included in the materials. 8
They claimed that Gateway provided these clauses because it intended to
engage in fraudulent conduct and did not want its customers to be able to
seek judicial redress for their resulting losses. 9 The Hills brought a class
action suit against Gateway, alleging breach of contract and seeking a
declaratory judgment that the clauses described above were not
enforceable. 10 In addition, they sued Gateway for violations of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Warranty
Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and the South Dakota Consumer Fraud Act.11
The district court's refusal to honor the arbitration clause was immediately
appealed by Gateway, which led to this Seventh Circuit opinion. 12
against Gateway in any dispute or controversy concerning this Agreement shall be to
seek recovery of the foregoing amount, upon the payment of which Gateway shall be
released from and discharged of all further obligations and liability to Buyer. IN NO
EVENT SHALL EITHER PARTY BE LIABLE TO THE OTHER FOR SPECIAL,
EXEMPLARY, CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL OR INDIRECT DAMAGES,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, LOSS OF ANTICIPATED PROFITS OR
ECONOMIC LOSS, EVEN IF THE OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH LOSS OR DAMAGE.
Id. at *2. (emphasis in original) Gateway did in fact offer to replace certain parts of the
computer system or refund the Hills' purchase price. See id.
7 The arbitration clause stated:
Any dispute or controversy arising out of or relating to the Agreement or its
interpretation shall be settled exclusively and finally by arbitration. The arbitration shall
be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce. The arbitration shall be conducted in Chicago,
Illinois, U.S.A. before a sole arbitrator. Any award rendered in any such arbitration
proceeding shall be final and binding on each of the parties, and judgment may be
enter d thereon in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Id.
8 In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit
pointed out that under the agreement, the Hills had 30 days to examine the agreement and
return the computer for a full refund. Instead, the Hills waited more than 30 days before
complaining about the computer's faulty performance and components. See id. at 1150.
9 See Hill, 1996 WL 650631, at -2.
l0 See id. at -1.
11 See id.
12 The portion of the district court opinion that is published discusses only class
certification standards. The Seventh Circuit cites the relevant portion of the unpublished
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While the Seventh Circuit's common sense approach initially seems
logical, a closer examination of the decision reveals the, court's
misapplication of the U.C.C. and the court's failure to consider applicable
provisions of a relevant federal statute, the Magnuson-Moss Consumer
Warranty Protection Act. Judge Easterbrook's terse opinion dealt only with
the arbitration clause in the agreement between the Hills and Gateway,
ultimately finding it valid.13 The court began by addressing the Hills' claim
that the arbitration clause did not "stand out." Relying on the recent
Supreme Court opinion in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, Inc., 14
the court stated that generally there is no requirement that an arbitration
clause be prominent to be enforceable. The Hills, reasoned the court, did
not need to read the contract provisions for them to be effective. Taking an
all-or-nothing approach, the court stated that "[tierms inside Gateway's box
stand or fall together," so that if the Hills did not contact Gateway within
30 days of receipt of the computer, then all of the contract provisions must
be enforced. 15
The court next spoke generally about "commercial transactions in
which people pay for products with terms to follow," 16 referring to a case
in which the Supreme Court enforced a forum-selection clause within three
pages of terms that accompanied a cruise ship ticket. 17 More significantly,
the court introduced another Seventh Circuit case, ProCD, Inc. v.
opinion pertaining to the arbitration clause: "it]he present record is insufficient to support a
finding of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties or that the plaintiffs were given
adequate notice of the arbitration clause." Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
13 See id. at 1151. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case with instructions to compel
the Hills to submit their claim to arbitration. The Hills filed a petition for rehearing en bane on
January 21, 1997. The petition was unanimously denied. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 96-
3294, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1877 (7th Cir. Feb. 3, 1997).
14 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996). In Doctor's Associates, a Montana statute required that
"Notice that a contract is subject to arbitration ... shall be typed in underlined capital letters
on the first page of the contract; and unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may
not be subject to arbitration." Id. at 1654. The Court held that Section 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act preempted the statute by providing that "A written provision . . . to settle by
arbitration . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon grounds that exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id. at 1656-1657.
15 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
16 Id
.
17 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). The case is not
precisely analogous, however, since, unlike the Hills, the plaintiffs in Carnival conceded that
they had notice of the forum selection provision. The Court explicitly reserved the question of
notice: "[Wle do not address the question whether respondents had sufficient notice of the
forum clause before entering the contract for passage." Id. at 590.
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Zeidenberg, 18 upon which it based the remainder of the Hill v. Gateway
analysis. 19 In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit held that one who buys a box of
software is bound by the terms inside the box after having had an
opportunity to read the terms and reject them by returning the product. 20
The court in ProCD framed the issue as one of contract formation: "A
vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may
propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance. A
buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as
acceptance." 21 Thus, according to ProCD, the vendor makes an offer by
making available a product at a certain price, with the contract provisions in
the box. The buyer accepts not simply by purchasing, but also by not
returning the item within a certain period of time, to be determined by the
vendor, the "master of the offer." If the buyer returns the item within the
set period of time, then the offer is rejected. The court concluded that
ProCD applied to the Hills' case, 22 so that the Hills accepted the contract
with all of its terms by not returning the computer system within thirty
days.23
The court then discussed the widespread use24 and practical advantages
of the approve-or-return method of contract formation in routine
commercial transactions. Commerce would be considerably frustrated if, for
example, a cashier had to read legal documents to customers before having
the customers pay for the items. Similarly, as in the present case, it would
be unduly burdensome to require a company salesperson to read pages of
documentation over the phone before taking a customer's credit card
number.25 Although the observations here are insightful, the court seems to
be answering an argument that the Hills did not make. Surely they did not
suggest that all contract terms be recited before purchase; rather certain
18 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
19 See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
20 See id. (citing ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1447).
21 Id. at 1452.
22 The Seventh Circuit used the following reasoning to conclude that ProCD applied to
Hill: Gateway and ProCD used the same sort of accept-or-return offer; the court in ProCD
relied on the U.C.C. instead of peculiarities of Wisconsin law; both states in the present case
have adopted the U.C.C.; neither party has pointed to any other atypical doctrines in those
states that might apply; therefore, ProCD applies to the present case. See Hill, 105 F.3d at
1149.
23 See id. at 1150.
24 The court noted that "[playment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for
air transportation, insurance, and many other endeavors." Id. at 1149.
25 The court in Hill noted, "[Tihe droning voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten
many potential buyers." Id.
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important, unusual terms, such as arbitration or liability limitation clauses,
should be disclosed prior to purchase or displayed prominently on written
materials accompanying the purchase.
The Hills attempted to distinguish ProCD, which dealt with a software
license, on the ground that it should apply only to executory contracts, or
licenses in particular. 26 ProCD would therefore not apply, because both
parties' performance of the agreement was complete when the Hills received
the computer system in their home.2 7 Not only were the parties'
performance not complete at this time, 28 opined the Seventh Circuit, but
ProCD and this case were not about performance at all, they were about
contract formation.29 The court seemed to be saying that the contract was
formed when the Hills' received the computer system and allowed thirty
days to elapse without contacting Gateway.
The court then summarily addressed the Hills' argument that ProCD is
irrelevant because the buyer in that case was a merchant, as opposed to
consumers, like the Hills. 30 The Hills pointed to Section 2-207(2) of the
U.C.C., the battle-of-the-forms provision, which states that "additional
terms [following acceptance of an offer] are to be construed as proposals for
addition to a contract. Between merchants, such proposals become part of
the contract unless . . . they materially alter it . "31 Distinguishing
ProCD, the Hills argued that the terms inside the software box were not
excluded by the "unless" clause. The court first disagreed with the Hills'
characterization of the ProCD buyer, Zeidenberg, as a merchant, because he
purchased the software at a retail store.32 Even if he was a merchant, the
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 The Seventh Circuit stated that performance was not complete because Gateway had
promised future performance in the form of future service and warranty obligations. See Id. at
1149-1150. The U.C.C., however, treats performance of a contract and contract warranties
as two mutually exclusive events. The U.C.C. refers to performance in terms of the seller's
basic obligation to tender conforming goods and the buyer's obligation to pay for them. See
U.C.C. §§ 2-301, 2-507, 2-511 (1977). Warranties of quality, on the other hand, are
governed separately in the code, independent of performance. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to 2-318
(1977). It would be anomalous if a buyer had to wait for the expiration of a warranty or
service agreement, here Gateway's "lifetime service," to determine whether or not the basic
obligations of the contract had been performed.
2 9 See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149-1150.
30 See id. at 1150.
31 Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-207). Courts have found that arbitration clauses are material
alterations. See, e.g., Bergquist Co. v. Sunroe Corp., 777 F. Supp. 1236, 1243-1247 (E.D.
Pa. 1991).
32 See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150. While the court correctly quoted the U.C.C. § 2-104(1)
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court stated, Section 2-207(2) would not apply because there was only one
form involved.33 Again, the court seemed to misunderstand that U.C.C.
Section 2-207 does not apply only to the situation when two forms are
exchanged. On the contrary, Official Comment 1 to Section 2-207 provides:
This section is intended to deal with two typical situations. The one is
the written confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either
orally or by informal correspondence between the parties and
followed by one or both of the parties sending formal memoranda
embodying the terms as far as agreed upon and adding terms not
discussed. [The other situation is the typical exchange of offer and
acceptance forms referred to by the Seventh Circuit.]34
The Hill/Gateway agreement falls precisely into the first described
situation. The Hills' oral agreement to purchase the computer system over
the phone was followed by Gateway's written embodiment of the
agreement, including terms not discussed. At the very least, the Hills'
U.C.C. arguments merit more comprehensive consideration than that
dispensed by the Seventh Circuit. 35
The court next dismissed a final ProCD distinction made by the Hills.
The software box in ProCD contained a notice that additional terms to the
contract were contained inside the box, while there was no such notice on
the box in which the Hills' computer was shipped. 36 Therefore, the Hills
argued, ProCD should not apply. In response, the court made its own
definition of merchant as "a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction," it seemed to misunderstand its proper application. Id. Comment
2 to § 2-104 commands courts to construe "merchant" broadly as it appears in, among other
provisions, § 2-207: "[flor purposes of these sections almost every person in business would,
therefore, be deemed to be a merchant ... ." U.C.C. § 2-104, cmt. 2 (1977). Surely, under
Judge Easterbrook's own description of him in ProCD, Zeidenberg would fall into the
category of "every person in business" when Zeidenberg "formed Silken Mountain Web
Services, Inc., to resell the information in the ... database (when] it]he corporation makes
the database available on the internet to anyone willing to pay its price .... ." ProCD, 86
F.3d at 1450. The most talented legal minds would be hard-pressed to construct a persuasive
argument that Zeidenberg was not a "person in business" in this situation.
33 See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150. This was the court's conclusion in ProCD. See id. (citing
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452).
34 U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 1 (1977) (emphasis added).
35 The drafters of Article 2 of the U.C.C. may deal with the issue of boxed contract
terms in the revision of Article 2, due to be released at the end of 1998.
36 See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
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distinction between the boxes. The software box in ProCD allowed the
consumer to look at the box in determining whether to buy the product
notwithstanding the additional terms in the box.37 Gateway's box, on the
other hand, was for shipping only, with the information on the outside of
the box intended for handlers rather than potential purchasers. 38 Under this
view, the purpose of the notice is to allow the purchaser to avoid potential
transaction costs involved in returning the product if the purchaser later
finds the terms inside unpalatable. 39 Such a notice would therefore be
unnecessary when the product is shipped to the purchaser sight unseen
because, at this point, these transaction costs now play no part in the
decision whether to purchase the product.
The court's myopic view of the notice's purpose is flawed for two
reasons. First, the stated functional purpose is too narrow. Indeed, although
a minority of purchasers may consider the costs of returning the product
relevant in their decision to purchase, that is neither the only nor the best
reason to print such a notice on the outside of the box. The obvious purpose
of such a notice is to alert the consumers of additional terms inside the box
so they can comply with those terms and be aware of unusual terms. Often a
consumer is required to register the product in order to take advantage of a
company's warranty. A consumer may need to know when a warranty
expires, in order to make a claim or extend the warranty in a timely
manner. Most relevant to this case, a consumer may want to be informed of
liability or dispute resolution limitations. In these situations, the concern is
not so much with the transaction costs of returning the item, but with
having notice of the important, relevant contract provisions that might be
overlooked by the average consumer not used to reading boilerplate
language.
Second, the court's view of the purpose of the notice is incomplete.
According to the court, the notice is no longer important after the purchaser
decides whether to buy the product. This view ignores the significance of
persuading the purchaser to actually read the agreement for warranty,
liability and dispute resolution limitations.
Whatever the notice on the box, the Seventh Circuit clearly placed the
onus on the consumer to "discover" the terms of the contract in advance,
rather than on the vendor to provide notice of the terms.40 The court
described three ways in which a purchaser could access important agreement
terms: (1) by asking the vendor to send the terms in advance; (2) by
consulting public sources such as the vendor's website; or (3) by inspecting
37 See id.
3 8 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id.
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the documents after delivery. 4 1 According to the court, the Hills accepted
the third option. The court concluded that by not contacting Gateway within
thirty days, the Hills agreed to all of the terms of the agreement, including
the arbitration clause.42
Most troubling about this opinion is the absence of any discussion of
the Magnuson-Moss Act,43 which deals squarely with the issue before the
court. 44 The Hills had two substantial arguments that the arbitration clause
was unenforceable under the Magnuson-Moss Act. First, Section 703.2
contains a list of requirements, in addition to any state law requirements,
that a vendor must comply with for an arbitration clause to be valid.45
Section 703.2(b) provides that the arbitration provision must be clear and
conspicuous 46 and on the face of the written warranty. 4 7 The Act contains
various other technical requirements about information that must be
included in the clause that Gateway may or may not have complied with. 4 8
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1994). Congress enacted the Act in 1974 -to improve the
adequacy of information available to consumers [and] prevent deception .... " Id. § 2302(a).
The Act deals primarily with consumer product warranties, including detailed guidelines for
the use of "informal dispute resolution." See 15 U.S.C.§ 2310 (1994); 16 C.F.R § 703
(1996).
44 The court mentions Magnuson-Moss only when discussing Gateway's obligation to
distribute warranty forms to potential purchasers on request. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150. The
Hills fall under the definition of "consumer" as required by the Act, and the computer,
because it was not purchased for resale, is a "consumer product." See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(1),
2301(3) (1994).
45 See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Regulations, 16 C.F.R. § 703.2 (1996).
46 See id. § 703.2(b). The Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court opinion in
Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casaroto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996), in finding no requirement that
Gateway's arbitration clause be "prominent." See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148. Doctor's
Associates, however, concerned a dispute between two parties to a franchise agreement,
neither of whom was a consumer, thus not implicating the Magnuson-Moss Act. This crucial
distinction makes Doctor's Associates inapposite, and the Seventh Circuit should have decided
whether Gateway fulfilled the Act's requirement of conspicuousness. While § 703 of the
Magnuson-Moss Act does not define the term "conspicious," the U.C.C. states that
"lLianguage in the body of a form is 'conspicious' if it is larger or other contrasting type or
color .... Whether a term or clause is 'conspicious' is for decision by the court." U.C.C. §
1-201(10)(1977). The arbitration clause, as reprinted in the unpublished district court opinion,
seems to have been printed in regular size, nonbold-faced type. See supra note 7.
47 The Act defines "on the face of the warranty" as on the side of the document where
the warranty begins. See Magnuson-Moss, 16 C.F.R. § 703.1(h)(1) (1996).
48 See Magnuson-Moss, 16 C.F.R. §§ 703.3-703.8 (1996).
[Vol. 12:3 1997]
HILL v. GATEWAY 2000, INC.
Second, even if Gateway complied with all of the Act's arbitration
clause requirements, it faced a steeper obstacle: the Act renders binding
arbitration agreements"9 in consumer product agreements unenforceable.
The Act provides that if a warrantor "establishes such a[n] [informal dispute
resolution] procedure," 50 and the procedure meets the requirements
described above,Sand if the warrantor "incorporates in a written warranty a
requirement that the consumer resort to such procedure before pursuing any
legal remedy 2 ... then... the consumer may not commence a civil action
*.. unless he initially resorts to such a procedure. " 53 The Act speaks only
of pursuing informal dispute resolution as a prerequisite to, not a
substitution for, civil action.54 The legislative history of the Act explicitly
supports this conclusion.55 Even if the Seventh Circuit somehow found for
Gateway on these section 703 issues, it nonetheless erred by not considering
the Act at all.
The Seventh Circuit's sloppy consideration of the U.C.C. and the
Magnuson-Moss Act aside, the case sends a loud message to consumers. At
least in the Seventh Circuit, Magnuson-Moss consumer protections have
49 Gateway's arbitration clause stated that "any dispute or controversy ... shall be
settled exclusively and finally by arbitration. . .[a~ny award rendered in any such arbitration
proceeding shall be final and binding on each of the parties . . . ." Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., No. 96 C-4086, 1996 WL 650631, at *2 (N.D. IIl. Nov. 7, 1996). Such language could
only be constr'ued as mandating binding arbitration.
50 Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(A) (1994).
51 See id. § 2310(a)C3)(B).
52 Id. § 2310(a)(3)(C) (emphasis added).
53 id.
54 For a recent illustration of the application of the Magnuson-Moss informal dispute
resolution provisions to render a similar arbitration clause unenforceable, see Wilson v.
Waverly Homes, No. 96-T-1017-N, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1361 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 1997).
55 The statements of Congressman Moss, co-sponsor of the bill, are relevant:
First, the bill provides the consumer with an economically, [sic] feasible private right of
action so that when a warrantor breaches his warranty or service contract obligations,
the consumer can have effective redress. Reasonable attorneys fees and expenses are
provided for the successful consumer litigant, and the bill is further refined so as to
place a minimum extra burden on the courts by requiring as a prerequisite to suit that
the purchaser give the [warrantor] reasonable opportunity to settle the dispute out of
court, including the use of a fair and formal dispute settlement-mechanism ....
119 Cong. Rec. 972 (Jan. 12, 1973). Moss's comments in the report on the bill articulate the
conclusion even more clearly: "An adverse decision in any formal dispute settlement
proceeding would not be a bar to a civil action on the warranty involved in the proceeding
... ." H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 41 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7723.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 12:3 1997]
eroded considerably and given way to vendor-friendly notions of caveat
emptor and duty to read. Consumers must now make the dichotomous,
possibly adhesive choice of accepting the terms of the contract completely at
their own peril, or wholly rejecting the contract and abandoning the
transaction. By eviscerating consumer protections, the Seventh Circuit holds
consumers to the same standards as businesses, leaving behind a dangerous
precedent depriving unwary consumers of their right to sue.
Mark A. French
